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Abstract 
 
At the center of debates on deliberative democracy is the issue of how much real deliberation 
citizens experience on a regular basis in their core social networks.  These “disagreements about 
disagreement” come in a variety of forms, with scholars advocating significantly different empirical 
approaches (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2006), and coming to significantly 
different substantive conclusions.  In this paper, we tackle these discrepancies through 
methodological advances and an investigation into the effects that conceptual differences have on 
key findings relating interpersonal political disagreement to political attitudes and behaviors 
 Drawing on the 2008 ANES panel study, we explore the consequences of making different 
assumptions about the definition and measurement of disagreement, ultimately speaking to the on-
going debate over whether a deliberative society can also be a participatory one (Mutz 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL, May 2010. 
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 As suggested by Lasswell’s (1936) classic definition of politics – who gets what, when, and 
how – conflict is inevitable in any political process.  Nevertheless, conflict also seems to be the part 
of government and politics most disliked by average voters.  At best, regular voters can be 
characterized as finding disagreement among elites distasteful (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), and 
with friends uncomfortable (Ulbig and Funk 1996).  At worst, disdain for conflict stemming from 
clashing points of view may lead to withdrawal from the public sphere, diminishing the relationship 
between citizens and policy-makers (Mutz 2006).   
 In the realm of political behavior, a recent revival of interest in conflict and disagreement 
stems from normative theories of political deliberation; these promote a different view of how a 
representative democracy functions effectively.  Though liberal theories emphasize the need for 
resource-endowed individuals to participate, deliberative theories focus on collective processes and 
exchange in viewpoints.  As a consequence, empirical scholars have devoted significant time and 
attention to understanding the behavioral consequences of debate, deliberation, and disagreement 
between regular citizens.   
 Although we have learned that structured deliberative settings produce many of the benefits 
identified by normative theorists (Chambers 1996; Fishkin 1995; though see Delli Carpini et al. 2004 
for a review and critiques), less is known about the role that everyday discussion – particularly 
discussion across lines of political difference – holds for political behavior.  Some research indicates 
that this form of disagreement between citizens makes minority voters less likely to vote with their 
underlying partisanship (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988; Sokhey and McClurg n.d.), increases opinion 
ambivalence (Mutz 2002), and decreases political participation (McClurg 2006a; Mutz 2002; 2006).  
Other research shows an opposite effect, suggesting that disagreement does not always disable 
engaged citizenship (Huckfeldt et al. 2004; McClurg 2006b; Nir 2005).  At present, the literature sits 
at an important juncture, with many inconsistencies begging explanation.  
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 At the core of this "disagreement about disagreement" are two analytic problems central to 
understanding the relevance of social communication for political behavior.  One revolves around 
the inadequate conceptualization and measurement of the core concept, namely political 
disagreement.  Although common practice has emerged from earlier research, almost no attention is 
given to outlining what is actually meant by disagreement, to developing adequate measures, and to 
examining the impact that alternative measurements have on our understandings of political 
behavior.   
 A second set of challenges center on the difficulties present in developing adequate causal 
estimates.  Klofstad (2007) notes that cross-sectional studies of social communication and political 
behavior are likely biased; this can occur both through the self-selection of respondents into particular 
networks, and by reciprocal causation between behaviors and discussion.  Nickerson (2005) and 
Klofstad (2007) lead a growing body of work in demonstrating that general estimates of political 
discussion effects are real, but that care must be exercised because of the aforementioned analytic 
biases.  Unfortunately, the majority of data available for testing theoretical claims about political 
disagreement – particularly with nationally representative samples – are cross-sectional, and 
therefore not particularly well-suited for addressing these problems. 
 In the sections that follow, we tackle interpersonal disagreement with an eye on both issues; 
we aim to bring conformity to practice and order to previous results.   Using matching to address 
causal inference, we employ two measures of disagreement that reflect general views about how to 
measure the concept: a general measure of how much people believe they disagree with members of 
their network, and a second one based on the perceived levels of partisanship of network members.  
Using both approaches, we examine how disagreement relates to vote choice and political 
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participation in a national sample of Americans from the 2008 American National Election Studies 
panel study.1   
Social Communication, Political Disagreement, and Political Behavior 
Why We Care About Political Disagreement.   
 Broadly conceived, political disagreement is defined as conversations where those engaged in 
discussion are exposed to political viewpoints that are different from their own.  Such exchanges are 
particularly important for understanding dynamics in political behavior; without the possibility of 
learning new information or views, there is little opportunity for social communication to change 
past behavior – put another way, disagreement drives the social influence process (McPhee 1963; 
Sprague 1982).  And, while it may be true that other forms of conversation may still influence 
behavior, it seems equally possibly that such discussions serve more in a reinforcing capacity. 
 More fundamentally, political disagreement is important because it may help us understand 
how individual preferences translate into citizen inputs into the political system.  When there is no 
exchange of views between citizens, the lines of debate are hard and fast, and should inhibit 
compromise among representative officials.  And, in such a situation, preferences are relatively fixed 
and the ability of governments to provide representation becomes largely a function of institutional 
design (Dahl 1963).  Yet when there is some exchange of views between citizens, public 
representation becomes a matter not just of how we aggregate preferences through institutions, but 
of how the public reacts to different viewpoints.  Indeed, multiple aggregate outcomes are possible, 
depending upon the behavioral consequences of encountering difference (Huckfeldt et al. 2004).   
 For instance, if conflicting views create intolerance for others' preferences, it can 
delegitimize governing elites who do not share the ideas of majorities.  Conversely, if disagreement 
causes some groups of voters (e.g., majority opinion holders) to express their opinions more 
                                                          
1 Future versions of this paper will include data and analyses from the 2000 American National Election Study.  
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insistently, or to participate more than others groups (e.g., minority opinion holders), then 
government may be more responsive to some groups than others (and on the basis of something 
other than the extent to which their beliefs are widely held) (Noelle-Neuman 1993)).  It is also 
possible that disagreement affects preferences themselves, suggesting that what is in the public's 
interest is a dynamic phenomenon that changes as we deliberate, potentially leading to "better" 
public opinion (Fishkin 1995) and policy outputs. 
What We Know About Political Disagreement.   
 For all these reasons, there is acute interest in how much disagreement occurs between 
citizens in their everyday lives, and in the effects that disagreement has on a variety of political 
attitudes and behaviors.  However, the answers to these questions have remained ambiguous.  
 For example, the fundamental question of how much disagreement exists between citizens is 
itself contested even in an era of sophisticated polling that allows us to clearly identify a survey 
respondent's discussants (Klofstad at el. 2009).  Nevertheless, a real debate has emerged over the 
typical American’s experience of disagreement.  Huckfeldt et al. (2004) have argued that the modal 
condition is some disagreement (based upon average network size and various probabilities of 
disagreement between any two members); Mutz (2006) makes an argument for low levels of 
disagreement  – she notes that not only are levels of disagreement between dyads very low in 
national probability samples, but that levels of communication in those dyads are also exceptionally 
low.  In the end, Mutz and Huckfeldt and colleagues look at similar data, but draw largely opposite 
conclusions.  
 Another significant line of debate focuses on the consequences of disagreement.  Mutz's 
seminal contributions (2002a, 2002b, 2006) on "cross cutting" discussion frame the question clearly: 
while disagreement leads to better understandings of and tolerance for different viewpoints, it leads 
to lower levels of political participation.  In short, she suggests that levels of disagreement force a 
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choice between participatory and deliberative forms of democracy.  Yet even while she makes this 
argument forcefully, there are indicators that the choice is perhaps not so stark.  On the one hand, 
some scholars report that disagreement is either positively or statistically insignificantly related to 
participation (e.g., Nir 2005).  On the other, some scholars suggest that the influence of 
disagreement is variable, subject to other elements in a person’s network (e.g., Djupe, Sokhey, and 
Gilbert 2007; McClurg 2006a), or the broader social context in which that disagreement occurs 
(McClurg 2006b; Noelle-Neuman 1993). 
 Although the impact of disagreement on some political attitudes and behaviors – for 
example, tolerance or ambivalence towards candidates – is not the subject of heated debate, close 
examinations of the literature trend toward inconsistencies on these points as well.  To a certain 
degree, this can be a consequence of different bases of evidence and varying theoretical 
predilections.  However,  as mentioned at the outset, there are two sorts of analytical problems that 
might also lead to such a state of affairs – inconsistent conceptualization and measurement of 
disagreement, and the problems that arise from cross-sectional, ego-centric data.  We now discuss 
these problems in more detail.  
Analytic Problems in the Study of Political Disagreement 
Measuring Disagreement   
 We argue ambiguities in previous research stem in part from different approaches to the 
analysis of political disagreement.  The first of these are different conceptualizations of disagreement 
and concomitant differences in measurement.  Conceptually, almost all political science studies 
employ measures that focus on some level of discussion occurring across lines of political difference.  
However, this is where the agreement about disagreement ends.  This is nicely illustrated by the 
measures used in two of the most well-cited studies in the field: Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague's 
(2004) Political Disagreement and Mutz's (2006) Hearing the Other Side.   
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 Huckfeldt et al. measure disagreement as the absence of agreement in the vote choice of a main 
respondent and her discussant.  According to their approach, a person who prefers one presidential 
candidate encounters disagreement even if their discussant prefers no presidential candidate.  There are 
many conceptual benefits to such a measurement approach; these include that it is anchored in 
political preferences, that it is about an individual’s perceptions of their communication 
environment, and that we have a very good sense of what the disagreement is about.  At the same 
time, the measurement may be appropriately conceived of as measuring the absence of agreement 
rather than the presence of disagreement.  In turn, this may overstate the importance of social 
exchanges with low political salience – exchanges that do not really create significant opportunities 
for learning that are central to theories of disagreement and deliberative democracy.  
 The approach used by Mutz is similar in spirit as she seeks to measure survey respondents’ 
perceptions of how much they disagree with their named discussants.  In practice her measure is 
different and implies a different conceptualization of disagreement.  Specifically, her approach is to 
create an index of disagreement that combines information on a variety of survey questions; these 
include shared vote preferences, shared partisan preferences, general perceptions of disagreement, 
general perceptions of shared opinions, and levels/frequencies of disagreement.  The strength of 
this measure is that it does not rely solely on a transient political choice for determining whether 
disagreement exists; it focused instead on more general social exchange.  Another potential strength is 
that this approach measures exposure to disagreement by including levels/the frequency of political talk 
in the index, rather than assuming that such disagreement is not reliant on how often interaction 
takes place.  Nevertheless, we argue that this measure is weighted towards very intense 
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disagreements, while overlooking the more common, less intense discussions that may hold 
behavioral consequences for voters in the context of an election campaign.2   
 We see these two measurement approaches – and the conceptualizations that they imply – as 
brackets on a range of conversational possibilities that may hold different behavioral consequences.  
While the Huckfeldt et al. measure allows for disagreement to occur in any exchange where 
agreement is absent (albeit in the context of voting), the Mutz measure is more likely to weigh 
intense and persistent disagreements more heavily.  Both measures capture political differences, but 
the range of conversations they capture (and their consequences) may vary dramatically.  For 
example, while the Huckfeldt et al. measure would suggest that widespread opportunities for 
learning something about politics exist (because there is an absence of support), the more intense 
political disagreements that the Mutz measure identifies probably border on conflict, and are therefore 
less likely to occur.  Additionally, intense disagreement may actually inhibit learning, as a long line of 
literature suggests that people seek to avoid it (e.g., Festinger 1957).  
 At base, we argue that the core difference is whether or not measures are inclusive of non-
intense disagreement.  Towards that end, we investigate the impact of disagreement through two 
measures that capture these elements – a partisanship difference measure (closer to the Huckfeldt 
and colleagues approach), and the general disagreement measure (closer to the Mutz approach).3  
Our examination is primarily focused on the extent to which these two different measures provide 
us with similar or divergent pictures of how disagreement influences political behavior.  In short, we 
question whether measurement differences are potentially the root cause of the aforementioned, 
inconsistent findings in the literature.   
                                                          
2 This is particularly true when we consider that most network questions on surveys solicit information on family and 
close friends, or people with whom we are likely biased against thinking that we "disagree" in any general sense.  In other 
words, pressure towards believing that we are in harmonious relationships may lead to the underreporting of all but the 
most significant disagreements. 
3 Future work will include an analysis of the vote-difference measure (via the 2000 American National Election Study).  
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Disagreement and Causal Inference  
 Research on political disagreement is explicitly interested in its consequences for political 
behavior.  However, as membership in social networks – and in particular, disagreeable exchanges –
is not forced upon individuals, the nature of the relationships themselves are the product (to some 
degree) of individual choices.  The implication of this is that any observed correlations between 
political behavior and the content of political discussions is analytically suspect; this is particularly 
true for cross-sectional data, where time cannot be leveraged against these processes.  
 Klofstad (2007) elaborates on this, noting three identification problems in social network 
research.  The first is the problem of selection bias, where disagreement and discussion in networks is 
driven by individuals’ political preferences and behaviors.  The second is the problem of reciprocal 
causation, where disagreement may affect political behavior, but feedback exists those behaviors to 
disagreement.  Finally, network researchers also have to be wary of spurious causation, where factors 
that lead to political behaviors – e.g., partisan intensity and/or educational level – also lead to the 
structure of a social network and certain levels of discussion.   
 Political scientists have adopted techniques to deal with these problems, and in the 
behavioral networks literature, scholars have responded with a combination of experimental design 
(Klofstad 2007; Nickerson 2005), and statistical techniques (Klofstad 2007).  Here we employ 
matching (Ho et al. 2007 for a discussion) – a statistical procedure used to impose experimental 
control on observational data – to address several of these hurdles facing the literature.  By 
conceptualizing disagreement as a treatment, we isolate its effects on behavioral outcomes of 
interest.  Below we discuss the data, measures, and this methodological tack in more detail.  
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DATA AND METHOD 
 Our evidence comes from the January 2009 release of the 2008-2009 American National 
Election Studies (ANES) Panel Survey (ANES 2009).4 This data set contains information collected 
at six different points in time over the course of the year 2008: January, February, June, September, 
October, and November. A nationally-representative sample of respondents was recruited to 
participate over the telephone, and completed each questionnaire over the Internet. Individuals 
without Internet access were supplied with a free web browsing device. Respondents received a $10 
incentive for each completed questionnaire. Additional information on how this study was 
conducted is available in DeBell et al. (2009). 
Independent Variables: Measure of Political Disagreement 
 In the September, 2008 questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify the members of 
their political discussion network through a “name generator” procedure (see Klofstad et al. 2009 
for details on similar procedures; see Knoke and Yang 2008 for more on ego-centric data 
structures). Specifically, respondents were first asked, “During the last six months, did you talk with 
anyone face-to-face, on the phone, by email, or in any other way about government or elections, or 
did you not do this with anyone during the last six months?” Those responding in the affirmative (N 
= 1225) were asked to name up to four individuals with whom they engaged in such discussion. 
Respondents were then asked a series of follow-up questions about each named discussant. 
 We opertationalize exposure to interpersonal political disagreement in two ways. One 
measure is based on the respondent’s perception of how much disagreement is occurring in his or 
her network (hereafter referred to as “perceived disagreement”). For each discussant, respondents 
were asked, “In general, how different are [DISCUSSANT NAME]’s opinions about government 
                                                          
4 “Note that the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study is entirely separate from the 2008 ANES Time Series study, which was 
conducted using the traditional ANES method of face-to-face interviews before and after the 2008 election. Although 
there are a few questions common to both studies, the samples and methods are different” (DeBell et al. 2009, p. 5). 
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and elections from your own views: extremely different, very different, moderately different, slightly 
different, or not at all different?” We first summed the disagreement scales for each member of the 
discussion network (i.e., we created a measure of the total amount of perceived disagreement in the 
network). The final disagreement scale is created by dividing the sum of the disagreement scales by 
the number of discussants mentioned by the respondent (this is done in order to make the scale 
comparable for respondents with differently-sized networks). 
 Our second measure of disagreement is based on the respondent’s report of the partisan 
leanings of her discussants (hereafter referred to as “cross-cutting partisanship). In turn, this 
measure is based on the standard ANES battery of questions producing a 7-point partisanship scale 
runing from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican.” To construct this partisanship-based 
disagreement scale, we subtracted the mean partisanship score of the discussion network – (to get 
this we took the sum of the identification scores for all discussants in a network, and divided by the 
number of discussants mentioned by the respondent) – from the respondent’s own partisanship 
score. Again, the mean of the network is used in order to make the scale comparable for 
respondents with differently sized networks. This yields a measure where both larger positive and 
negative numbers indicate greater levels of partisan disagreement between the respondent and his or 
her discussants. As such, we use the absolute value of this measure as the final scale, where higher 
positive values indicate greater disagreement. 
Dependent Variables 
 In the following analyses, we examine the relationship between exposure to disagreement 
and a number of different measures of political preferences and behavior. Each of these dependent 
variable were gathered in waves of the panel survey subsequent to when the network data were 
collected in September, 2008. This temporal separation between the independent and dependent 
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variables (with disagreement measured prior to the dependent variables) increases the precision of 
our analysis.  
 Our first set of dependent variables captures the strength of respondents’ political 
preferences. One variable measures how certain respondents were about their 2008 vote presidential 
vote choice in October of 2008. Respondents were first asked to predict their vote choice, after 
which they were asked, “How sure are you of that: extremely sure, very sure, moderate sure, slightly 
sure, or not sure at all?” A second variable measures the strength of respondents’ partisanship in 
November of 2008, based on the standard ANES self-identification question that yields a 7-point 
scale running from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican.” Strength of partisanship is 
operationalized by “folding” the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale that runs from “Independent” to 
“Strong Partisan.” Finally, we also examined the relationship between disagreement and strength of 
ideology, based on the standard ANES self-identification question that yields a 7-point scale running 
from “Very Liberal” to “Very Conservative.” As with strength of partisanship, strength of ideology 
is operationalized by transforming the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale that runs from “Moderate” 
to “Strong Ideologue.” 
 Our second set of dependent variables are concerned with how civically engaged 
respondents were during the course of the 2008 election. One measure captures media use in 
October, 2008 by summing the number of days per week that respondents used television, radio, the 
Internet and newspapers for news consumption. A second measure gauges how interested 
respondents were in politics during November, 2008 based on the question, “How interested are 
you in information about what’s going on in government and politics: extremely interested, very 
interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, or not interested at all?” We also examine two 
measures of political efficacy in November of 2008. The first measures external efficacy based on 
the question, “How much do government officials care what people like you think: a great deal, a 
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lot, a moderate amount, a little, or not at all?” The second measures internal efficacy based on the 
question, “How much can people like you affect what the government does: a great deal, a lot, a 
moderate amount, a little, or not at all?” 
 Finally, we also examine two additional measures of political engagement and participation. 
The first measures how frequently respondents engaged in political discussion in November, 2008, 
based on the question, “During a typical week, how many days do you talk about politics with family 
or friends?” Unlike the more detailed discussion network questions administered in September, 
2008, this variable is a much simpler indicator of how actively respondents were engaged in political 
dialogue. Finally, we also look at voter turnout in the 2008 election, as self-reported in the 
November, 2008 wave of the panel. 
Method: Data Preprocessing 
In order to increase the precision of our analysis, we address the analytical biases discussed 
above by preprocessing the ANES data with a “matching” procedure (e.g., Dunning, 2008; Ho, 
King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b). Under this procedure the effect of being 
exposed to political disagreement is more accurately measured by comparing the attitudes and 
behaviors of survey respondents who are similar to one another, save the fact that one was exposed 
to disagreement and the other was not; in other words, the idea is that the researcher imposes some 
degree of “experimental” control on what is observational data. By comparing the attitudes and 
behaviors of similar individuals who were and were not exposed to disagreement, we can be 
confident that any observed difference in attitudes and behaviors between them is unrelated to the 
factors that the respondents were matched on, and as such, is a consequence of being exposed to 
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disagreement instead of some confounding factor.5 More detail on how this procedure was 
conducted is included in the appendix. 
RESULTS6 
Who Is Exposed to Disagreement? 
 Before examining the effect that disagreement might have on one’s political preferences and 
behaviors, we first examine what types of individuals are exposed to disagreeable dialogue. Tables 1-
2 present variables that correlate with exposure to disagreement in one’s political discussion 
network; again, these were collected in waves of the ANES Panel Study that occurred before the 
network battery was administered (i.e., “pre-treatment”).   Disagreement is dichotomized at the 
mean disagreement score, where above mean indicates a disagreeable network (the treatment) and 
below the mean indicates an agreeable network (the control). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Table 1 shows the various covariates of perceived disagreement – measured in terms of 
general perceived disagreement – in one’s political discussion network. Specifically, the percentages 
demonstrate that women are less likely to be embedded in disagreeable networks than men. 
Individuals in disagreeable networks are less partisan/ideological, and also have weaker attitudes 
about the Republicans and Democrats. However, while their weaker preferences might signal 
                                                          
5 Matching is less precise than a controlled experiment because the procedure does not account for unobserved 
differences between individuals who were and were not exposed to disagreement (e.g., Arceneaux et al. 2006). However, 
given the extensive set of pre-treatment covariates that were used in the matching procedure (see the appendix), it is 
difficult to think of any meaningful unobserved factors that are not accounted for in the analysis. Moreover, unobserved 
differences between individuals who did and did not engage in civic talk are likely to correlate with observed differences, 
and as such are accounted for by proxy in the matching procedure (Stuart and Green 2008). As such, given that a true 
experiment is an extremely difficult (if not impossible) research design to execute for this research question, matching (in 
concert with panel data) is arguably a next best alternative. 
 
6 All results exclude individuals who did not report having any political discussants (N = 312, or 20% of the 1567 cases 
in the data set).  
15 
 
political disengagement, individuals in disagreeable networks consume more news media, are more 
knowledgeable about politics, are more likely to have donated money to a political or social 
organization, are more likely to have attended a meeting about political or social matters, and are 
more likely to have recruited someone else to attend such a meeting. As such, the data suggest that 
individuals in disagreeable networks are more politically engaged, but more agnostic about their 
political leanings when compared to individuals in agreeable networks. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Table 2 examines the correlates of exposure to our second measure, cross-cutting 
partisanship. In contrast to Table 1, these data show that individuals embedded in cross-cutting 
discussion networks have stronger political preferences than individuals in agreeable networks. As in 
Table 1, however, these data also indicate that individuals in cross-cutting networks are more likely 
to have engaged in protest behaviors, and are more likely to have distributed political information. 
Taken together then, the results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that individuals who are exposed to 
disagreement tend to be more civically engaged and active compared to individuals in more 
agreeable networks. However, the data also suggest that general perceived disagreement and cross-
cutting partisanship are capturing different forms of disagreement; individuals who perceive general 
disagreement have weaker political preferences, while individuals who experience measures by a lack 
of shared partisan preferences have stronger political preferences. 
The Effect of Disagreement on Political Preferences and Behavior 
The remaining tables present multivariate analyses of the relationship between exposure to 
disagreement in one’s political discussion network, and various measures of political preferences and 
behavior. To reduce the analytical biases described in the data and methods section, each of these 
analyses incorporated the matching data preprocessing procedure (again, please see the appendix for 
a description). The precision of the analysis is also increased by the inclusion of a number of 
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variables that are known to be correlated with political preferences and behavior: demographic 
characteristics, strength of political preferences, past patterns of political behavior, and civic 
engagement. Each of these variables were measured months before the data on political 
disagreement were collected, allowing us to assess the effect of exposure to political disagreement 
while controlling for “who the respondent was” – i.e., at the “pre-treatment” stage – before they 
were or were not exposed to disagreement.  
Strength of Political Preferences 
 In Table 3 we begin our analysis by estimating the effect of exposure to disagreement on our 
measures of strength of political preferences; for each dependent variable, results are presented side-
by-side for general disagreement and partisanship-based disagreement. The data in the first two 
columns show a positive relationship between exposure to disagreement and being uncertain about 
one’s impending vote choice for president, regardless of which measure is used. Substantively, for 
example, individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social network are estimated to be 
thirteen percentage points less likely to “extremely” certain about their vote choice (a decrease from 
72% among those who did not perceive general disagreement, to 59% among those who did so).7 
The second measure, cross-cutting partisanship, is estimated to have decreased the likelihood of a 
respondent being “extremely” certain about her vote choice by five percentage points (a decrease 
from 68% among those who are not in cross-cutting partisan networks, to 63% among those in 
cross-cutting networks). 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 The next four columns in Table 3 show the relationship between disagreement and strength 
of partisan and ideological preferences, respectively. The data show that while we cannot detect a 
systematic relationship between exposure to cross-cutting partisanship and strength of political 
                                                          
7 All substantive interpretations of coefficients are estimated holding all other factors in the model at their means. These 
estimates were derived using the “setx” and “sim” procedures in the “Zelig” package for R (Imai et al. 2007a and b). 
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preferences, we find a significant negative relationship for perceived general disagreement.8 
Substantively, individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social network are estimated 
to be twelve percentage points less likely to be “strong” partisans (a decrease from 50% among 
those who did not perceived disagreement, to 38% among those who did perceive disagreement); 
they are estimated to be four percentage points less likely to be “strong” ideologues (a decrease from 
20% among those who did not perceive general disagreement, to 16% among those who did 
perceive disagreement). 
Civic Engagement 
 Using the same model specification presented in Table 3, Table 4 presents the estimated 
relationship between the two measures exposure to disagreement and various measures of civic 
engagement. The first two columns of the table show that while we are unable to detect a 
relationship between perceived general disagreement and news media usage, individuals in cross-
cutting partisan networks consumed less news media on the eve of the election in October of 2008. 
Substantively, however, the relationship between exposure to partisan cross-pressuring and media 
use is quite small – individuals embedded in cross-pressured social networks only consumed six 
percent less media content (a decrease from a score of 15.8 on the 28-point consumption scale 
among those who were not cross-pressured, to a score of 14.9 for those who were cross-pressured). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The next two columns of Table 4 show a negative relationship between perceived general 
disagreement and interest in politics; we do not detect such a relationship with partisan cross-
pressuring.9 Substantively, however, the effect of perceptions of general disagreement on political 
interest is very meager. For example, individuals who perceived disagreement in their social network 
                                                          
8 Substituting measures of partisan and ideological strength collected in October, 2008 instead of November 2008 
produces comparable results, with the exception of the relationship between perceived disagreement and ideological 
strength; the coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant (b = -.14, s.e. = .08; p = .11). 
9 The October, 2008 measure of political interest produces comparable results. 
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are estimated to be only one percentage point less likely to be “extremely” or “very” interested in 
politics (a decrease from 76% among those who did not perceive disagreement, to 74% among those 
who did perceive disagreement).10 In the last four columns we do not detect any systematic 
relationships between exposure to disagreement and either form of political efficacy.11 
Political Discussion and Voter Turnout 
Finally, again using the same modeling scheme, we examine the effect that political 
disagreement has on rates of political discussion and voter turnout. The first two columns 
demonstrate that perceived general disagreement predicts less frequent instances of political 
discussion; we do not detect a systematic relationship between partisan cross-pressure disagreement 
and political discussion.12 Substantively, the relationship between perceived disagreement and 
political discussion is quite small. Individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social 
network were only five percent less talkative about politics with their friends and family (a decrease 
from 3.8 days per week among those who did not perceive disagreement, to 3.6 days per week 
among those who did perceive disagreement). Importantly, in the last two columns of Table 5 we do 
not detect any relationship between political disagreement and voter turnout in the 2008 election. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 The two measures of interpersonal disagreement from the 2008-09 ANES panel do not map 
perfectly onto those used by Mutz (e.g., 2006) and Huckfeldt and colleagues (e.g., 2004).  However, 
each does capture their essential elements; the general disagreement measure shares much with the 
index-based approach of Mutz; the partisanship-based item is similar to the vote-based method. To 
                                                          
10 If we substitute the October measure of political interest for the November, 2008 measure, the result is insignificant 
(b = .12, s.e. = .08; p = .13).  
11 The same is true is we use October, 2008 measures of efficacy (with the exception of the relationship between cross-
pressuring partisanship and internal efficacy (b = .16, s.e. = .08; p = .05)_. 
12 The October, 2008 measure of political discussion produces comparable results for perceived disagreement, but not 
for partisan cross-pressuring (b = -.07, s.e. = .03; p = .03). 
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reiterate, we view the essential difference between these two sides as revolving around the extent to 
which measures of general disagreement weigh particularly intense conflicts over the more casual 
exchanges that are a part of many people’s everyday lives.   
 Our initial analysis demonstrated that these measures are picking up on different processes – 
while the more civically engaged are more likely to experience both types of political disagreement, 
those individuals who are exposed to general political disagreement tend to have weaker political 
preferences, while those who experience partisanship-based interpersonal political disagreement tend 
to have stronger political preferences.   
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 Moreover, as table 6 demonstrates, these two types of disagreement also have distinct effects 
across a range of political outcomes.  Having pre-processed our data to account for a host of 
confounding factors – and using identical specifications for each set of models – we find that the 
two “treatments” do not match on direction 1/3 of the time (i.e., for 3 of 9 dependent variables); 
they do not match in terms of their statistical significance/insignificance over ½ of the time (i.e., for 
5 of 9 models).   And, even when the two measures do match in terms of directionality and statistical 
significance, they do not match in terms of the size of their effects.  For example, we find that 
general disagreement has a much larger effect when it comes to decreasing vote certainty relative to 
partisanship-based disagreement.  
 One finding that is particularly noteworthy in-light of the recent debate over disagreement is 
the result regarding turnout in the 2008 presidential election. While Mutz (2002; 2006) argues that 
disagreement leads to decreased participation (through mechanisms of ambivalence and social 
accountability), we find no evidence of such a relationship after accounting for the factors that 
potentially select people into certain types of micro-social environments.  Moreover, not only are the 
20 
 
estimates non-significant across both measures of disagreement, but we find that general 
disagreement predicts casting a vote, while partisanship based disagreement predicts the opposite.   
 Taken together, the results reaffirm that networks do produce real political effects 
independent of other factors.  At the same time, they remind us of a fundamental lesson that has 
largely escaped the study of political networks: how we measure concepts matters.  Different types 
of disagreement not only reflect different social processes (Tables 1 and 2), but appear to have 
different effects when it comes to individuals’ political preferences, their patterns of political 
engagement, and their likelihoods of political participation.   Disagreement does not have simple, 
easily characterized effects, and therefore may not be a double-edged sword for democratic practice.  
In turn, this suggests that our focus should not be on keeping the good parts of disagreement (i.e., 
those that produce tolerance) while changing or ameliorating the bad (i.e., those that suppress 
participation).  Rather, we should modify the often-asked question of who experiences disagreement 
to consider who experiences what kinds of disagreement.  
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APPENDIX 
 For this analysis, a “full matching” procedure was used (Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993; Hansen 
2004; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b; Rosenbaum, 1991; Stuart and Green 
2008). The procedure was conducted using the “MatchIt” package for R (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 
2007a; Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 2007b), which makes use of the “optmatch” package (Hansen, 
2004). The ANES Panel Survey data set is tailor-made for matching because subjects were surveyed 
about various attitudes and behaviors in waves of the panel (January, February, and June, 2009) that 
occurred before they were asked about their political discussion network (September, 2009). Based on 
the results presented in Tables 1 and 2, each of the pre-treatment variables that correlated with a 
given measure of exposure to disagreement were included in the matching procedure. 
The full matching procedure involved three steps. First, study subjects were classified as 
either having been “treated” or “untreated” with disagreement. Respondents who were exposed to 
an above-average amount of disagreement were classified as having been treated, while those who 
were exposed to a below-average amount of disagreement were classified as untreated.13 Second, the 
variables included in the matching procedure were used to estimate a score of one’s propensity to be 
exposed to disagreement (Hansen, 2004; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b). 
Third, at least one untreated subject was matched to at least one treated subject based on how close 
the propensity scores were between treated and untreated subjects (i.e., a process of creating 
“subclasses,” where more than one treated subject could be matched to an untreated subject, and 
vice-versa). Each untreated subject was only matched to one treated subject, and vice-versa (i.e., 
matching without replacement). Also, after a subject was initially matched he or she could have been 
moved and matched to a different subject before the procedure concluded in order to improve the 
                                                          
13 For the average level of perceived disagreement, this resulted in the classification of 633 treated subjects, and 622 
untreated subjects. For cross-cutting partisanship, this resulted in the classification of 517 treated subjects, and 738 
untreated subjects. 
22 
 
overall similarity between the treated and untreated subjects in the data set (i.e., the process is 
“optimal” not “greedy”). 
The results of the matching procedure were incorporated into the analysis by weighting the 
regression models. All treated subjects were given a weight of 1. Untreated subjects were assigned a 
weight equal to the number of treated subjects in the subclass that they were assigned to, divided by 
the number of untreated subjects in the subclass that they were assigned to. For example, an 
untreated subject who was assigned to a subclass with 10 treated subjects and 1 untreated subject 
was assigned a weight of 10, while an untreated subject who was assigned to a subclass with 1 
treated subject and 10 untreated subject was assigned a weight of .10. Consequently, an untreated 
subject who is similar to many treated subjects is given more weight in the analysis than an untreated 
subject who was similar to only a few treated subjects. Otherwise stated, applying this weight causes 
the regression models to pay more attention to untreated subjects who are similar to treated 
subjects, and less attention to untreated subjects who are dissimilar to treated subjects – this makes 
the analysis a better comparison between the treated and untreated subjects than if the data were not 
weighted. 
Table A.1: Improvement in Balance Between Treated and Untreated Cases 
 
Average Perceived 
Disagreement 
Total Perceived 
Disagreement 
Cross-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Overall 99.6% 99.6% 100.0% 
QQ Plot Summary Statistics 
Median 95.3% 92.7% 96.7% 
Mean 93.3% 91.4% 95.5% 
Max 85.3% 85.6% 91.7% 
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study 
  
The results presented in Table A.1 illustrate how the matching procedure increased the 
similarity, or “balance” (Ho et al. 2007a and 2007b), between subjects who did and did not engage in 
disagreement. The first row in the table shows the overall improvement in similarity between treated 
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and untreated subjects, as measured by the subject’s estimated propensity to be exposed to 
disagreement (i.e., the propensity score created by the matching procedure). Overall, the similarity in 
the propensity to be exposed to disagreement between the “treated” and “untreated” increased by 
around 100 percent as a result of the matching procedure. The remaining rows of the table show the 
summary statistics from “QQ plots.” QQ plots are two-dimensional graphs which plot the empirical 
distribution of a variable among treated subjects on one axis against the empirical distribution of 
that same variable among untreated subjects on the other axis. The closer this plotted line is to the 
45-dergee line on the graph, the closer treated and untreated subjects are to being perfectly balanced 
on that variable. The results in Table A.1 show that the median, mean and maximum distance of the 
propensity score QQ plot from the 45-degree line were all greatly improved due to the matching 
procedure. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Who is Exposed To Disagreement? (Perceived Disagreement) 
 Type of Network  
(09/2008) Difference 
 Agreeable Disagreeable 
Gender (Female) 59.9% 52.4% 
-7.5% 
(t = 2.66, p < .01) 
Strength of Partisanship (01/2008) 3.1 2.9 
-.2 
(t = 5.31, p < .01) 
Strength of Ideology (01/2008) 2.7 2.6 
-.1 
(t = 2.02, p = .05) 
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About Democrats  
(01/2008) 
2.7 2.4 
-.3 
(t = 4.15, p = > .01) 
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About Republicans  
(01/2008) 
2.6 2.3 
-.3 
(t = 4.72, p = > .01) 
Media Use  (01/2008) 15.1 15.8 
+.7 
(t = -2.01, p = .05) 
Political Knowledge  (02/2008) 4.0 4.3 
+.3 
(t = -3.28, p < .01) 
Has Ever Given Money to Organization 
Concerned with Political or Social Issue (06/2008) 
62% 68% 
+6% 
(t = -2.72, p = .08) 
Has Ever Attended a Meeting About 
Political/Social Concerns (06/2008) 
54% 61% 
+7% 
(t = -2.72, p = .01) 
Has Ever Invited Someone to a Meeting About 
Political/Social Concerns (06/2008) 
29% 34% 
+5% 
(t = -2.00, p = .08) 
 
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study 
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Table 2: Who is Exposed To Disagreement? (Cross-Cutting Partisanship) 
 Type of Network (09/08) 
Difference 
 Agreeable Disagreeable 
Strength of Partisanship (01/08) 2.7 3.4 
+.7 
(t = -12.82, p < .01) 
Strength of Ideology (01/08) 2.6 2.8 
+.2 
(t = -3.80, p < .01) 
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About 
Democrats (01/08) 
2.4 2.7 
+.3 
(t = -5.25, p = > .01) 
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About 
Republicans (01/08) 
2.3 2.6 
+.3 
(t = -3.88, p = > .01) 
Ever Joined a Protest, Rally, 
Demonstration (06/08) 
28% 33% 
+5% 
(t = -1.82, p = .08) 
Has Ever Distributed Political 
Information or Advertisements (06/08) 
32% 37% 
+5% 
(t = -1.71, p = .09) 
 
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study 
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Table 3: The Effect of Disagreement on Strength of Political Preferences 
 Vote Certainty 
(10/08) 
Strength of Party ID 
(11/08) 
Strength of Ideology 
(11/08) 
 Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Exposed to Disagreement 
(09/08) 
-.32** (.12) -.16* (.09) -.21*** (.07) .02 (.08) -.20** (.08) -.06 (.11) 
Demographics       
Gender (Female) .02 (.10) .11 (.10) .13 (.08) .17** (.08) -.001 (.07) -.10 (.10) 
Age 
.003 (.003) 
> -.001 
(.003) 
-.003 (.01) -.004 (.003) -.006 (.003) -.003 (.004) 
Race (Non-White) .11 (.14) -.03 (.15) .08 (.14) .05 (.15) -.19 (.13) -.19 (.17) 
Education .02 (05) .04 (.06) -.04 (.05) -.04 (.05) -.03 (.04) -.03 (.04) 
Income -.003 (.01) -.006 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.003 (.01) .008 (.01) .02 (.01) 
Strength of Preferences 
(01/08) 
      
Strength of Partisanship .21*** (.05) .34*** (.05) .87*** (.05) .86*** (.07) .23*** (.05) .26*** (.06) 
Strength of Ideology .20*** (.04) .21*** (.05) .22*** (.05) .21*** (.05) .64*** (.04) .63*** (.06) 
Direction of Preferences 
(01/08) 
      
Partisanship (Democrat-
Republican) 
-.01 (.02) -.005 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.005 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) 
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative) 
-.06*** (.02) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
-.04 (.03) -.04 (.02) .05* (.02) .04* (.02) 
Past Patterns of Political 
Behavior 
      
Voted in 2004 -.23 (.19) -.15 (.14) .31 (.18) .46** (.18) .22 (.17) .15 (.16) 
Civic Engagement       
Political Interest (01/08) .18*** (.05) .20*** (.04) .09* (.05) .12* (.06) .12*** (.04) .10* (.05) 
Political Knowledge (02/08) .06* (.04) .03 (.03) -.03 (.04) -.07 (.04) .08* (.04) .03 (.05) 
       
Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
2644 2366 2473 2115 2773 2763 
N 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
Model Type: Ordered Probit (Imai et al. 2007c) 
Note: Estimated cut points are not presented. 
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study 
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Table 4: The Effect of Disagreement on Civic Engagement 
 Media Use (10/08)a Political Interest (11/08)b External Efficacy (11/08)b Internal Efficacy (11/08)b 
 Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Exposed to Disagreement 
(09/08) 
-.33 (.42) -.90** (.36) -.12* (.07) -.14 (.10) -.01 (.10) -.01 (.08) .01 (.07) -.08 (.09) 
Demographics         
Gender (Female) -.48 (.39) -.65 (.47) .08 (.10) .13 (.10) .23*** (.08) .24*** (.08) .18** (.08) .14** (.07) 
Age .08*** (.02) .08*** (.01) .01* (.003) .01* (.003) .001 (.002) .002 (.002) -.003 (.002) -.003 (.003) 
Race (Non-White) .08 (.49) .34 (.49) .28** (.13) .10 (.10) .16* (.09) .15 (.09) .39*** (.10) .42*** (.10) 
Education -.05 (.27) -.14 (.19) .02 (.07) .02 (.05) .10** (.04) .08 (.05) .07* (.04) .03 (.03) 
Income .18*** (.05) .16*** (.05) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .002 (.01) -.01 (.01)  -.001 (.01) -.02 (.01) 
Strength of Preferences (01/08)         
Strength of Partisanship .22 (.20) .30 (.28) .08 (.05) .13*** (.05) .10 (.05) .14**(.06) .09** (.04) .08 (.06) 
Strength of Ideology -.11 (.21) -.21 (.26) .11*** (.04) .10* (.06) .03 (.04) .01 (.04) .06 (.05) .04 (.04) 
Direction of Preferences (01/08)         
Partisanship (Democrat-Republican) -.07 (.10) -.11 (.07) -.03 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.002 (.02) .002 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) 
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative) -.06 (.13) -.14 (.10) -.05* (.02) -.05** (.02) -.08 (.02) -.08** (.03) -.05* (.03) -.06** (.02) 
Past Patterns of Pol. Behavior         
Voted in 2004 1.24 (.88) 1.29 (.84) .44** (.17) .31 (.24) .34** (.13) .19 (.17) .27** (.12) .24* (.13) 
Civic Engagement         
Political Interest (01/08) 
1.45*** (.22) 
1.42*** 
(.24) 
.73*** (.05) .76*** (.07) .13** (.05) .13*** (.04) .22*** (.06) .24*** (.04) 
Political Knowledge (02/08) .58*** (.14) .64*** (.19) .03 (.03) .02 (.05) .01 (.03) .01 (.05) -.02 (.05) -.002 (.03) 
Intercept .47 (1.63) 1.63 (1.53) --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Adjusted R2 .21 .22 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Akaike’s Information Criterion  --- --- 2730 2657 3173 3193 3388 3384 
N 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
Model Type: aOrdinary Least Squares (Imai et al. 2007d); bOrdered Probit (Imai et al. 2007c); cPoisson (Imai et al. 2007e) 
Note: Estimated cut points are not presented. 
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study 
31 
 
Table 5: The Effect of Disagreement on Political Discussion and Voter Turnout 
 Political Discussion 
(11/2008)a 
2008 
Voter Turnoutb 
 Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Perceived 
Disagreement 
X-Cutting 
Partisanship 
Exposed to Disagreement 
(09/2008) 
-.06*(.03) -.02 (.04) .32 (.27) -.32 (.24) 
Demographics     
Gender (Female) .06 (.04) .07** (.03) .38 (.26) .45 (.33) 
Age > .001 (.001) > .001 (.001) .02 (.01) .02* (.01) 
Race (Non-White) -.01 (.06) -.03 (.09) -.02 (.30) -.14 (.41) 
Education .003 (.02) .03 (.02) .22 (.16) .23* (.13) 
Income .02*** (.004) .01** (.01) .02 (.04) .04 (.04) 
Strength of Preferences 
(01/2008) 
    
Strength of Partisanship .02 (.02) .07*** (.02) .06 (.15) .07 (.14) 
Strength of Ideology .02 (.02) .02 (.02) .22 (.17) .20 (.16) 
Direction of Preferences 
(01/2008) 
    
Partisanship (Democrat-
Republican) 
-.01* (.007) -.01** (.01) -.09 (.06) -.08 (.06) 
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.05 (.08) -.03 (.08) 
Past Patterns of Political 
Behavior 
    
Voted in 2004 .12 (.08) .11 (.09) 2.11*** (.51) 1.79*** (.51) 
Civic Engagement     
Political Interest (01/2008) .25*** (.02) .24*** (.04) .21 (.14) .30** (.13) 
Political Knowledge (02/2008) .03*** (.01) .03 (.03) .14* (.08) -.02 (.10) 
Intercept -.16 (.14) -.34** (.14) -3.21*** (.90) -2.82*** (.88) 
     
Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
5158 5157 639 596 
N 1225 1225 1225 1225 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
Model Type: aPoisson (Imai et al. 2007e); bLogitistic (Imai et al. 2007f) 
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study 
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Table 6: Summary of Findings by Types of Political Outcomes 
 Treatment   
Outcome General 
Political 
Disagreement 
Partisanship-based 
Disagreement 
Directional 
Match?  
Both 
Significant/ 
Insignificant? 
Strength of Political Preferences     
Vote Certainty Negative* Negative* Y Y 
Strength of Party 
Identification 
Negative* Positive N N 
Strength of Ideology Negative* Negative Y N 
Civic Engagement     
Media Use Negative Negative* Y N 
Political Interest  Negative* Negative Y N 
External Efficacy  Negative Negative Y Y 
Internal Efficacy  Positive Negative N Y 
Other Participatory Activities      
Political Discussion  Negative* Negative Y N 
2008 Turnout  Positive Negative N Y 
Source: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study 
Note: *=statistically significant finding  
All results come from models estimated on matched data.  Please see Appendix A for details.  
 
